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Abstract 
This study examines African populations` attitudes toward anti-corruption policies. Previous studies only look at 
individuals` experiences or attitudes with respect to corruption itself or its prevalence. Relying on micro data from six 
Sub-Saharan African countries and using ordered probit models, we show that social factors (education, employment, 
living conditions, etc.) significantly affect the citizens` attitudes toward anti-corruption strategies. We also highlight the 
importance of political characteristics such as access to information (press, media, radio); trust in the court of appeal; 
participations in demonstrations.
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In the recent decades, thanks partly to growing research (see for example Andvig and 
Moene, 1990; Mauro, 1995; 1998; Mo, 2001; Gerlagh and Pellegrini, 2004) and policy 
campaigns led by international organizations (Transparency International, World Bank, 
African Development Bank, United Nations Development Program, etc.) awareness about 
perverse effects of corruption have been increasing among public authorities as well as 
among citizens. In order to fight the plague, many developing countries have therefore 
launched anti-corruption programs. In Sub-Saharan African countries, a number of national 
anti-corruption commissions have been created. The main objective is to combat all forms of 
corruption and crime activities in the public sphere. Anti-corruption policies include strong 
measures such as prosecution, punishment of corrupted officials, jails, etc. As part of this 
agenda, these countries have also approved different treaties: the African Parliamentarians’ 
Network against Corruption (1999), the United Nations convention against corruption (2003), 
the African Union convention on preventing and combating corruption (2003), etc.  
 
The objective of this paper is to investigate citizen attitudes toward anti-corruption 
policies in six selected sub-Saharan African countries (Ghana, Mali, Nigeria, Tanzania, 
Uganda and South Africa). There has been remarkably little empirical work aiming at 
evaluating the anti-corruption policy undertaken by public authorities in these countries. So 
far, attention was given to the perception of corruption and its microeconomic factors 
(Čábelková, 2001; Reinikka and Svensson, 2003, 2005; Guerrero and Rodríguez-Oreggia, 
2008; Mocan, 2008). Previous studies highlighted the importance of individual, social and 
political factors, reflecting the extent to which individuals participate in corrupt transactions, 
express their experience (their own or that of their relatives) vis-à-vis corruption in public 
services. Focusing on attitudes toward handling of corruption, the present paper considers the 
role of citizens in the evaluation of the performance of anti-corruption policies.  
 
2- Econometric analysis 
2.1- The empirical methodology 
  The method used in this study is based on a pseudo panel in which we have survey 
data on individuals from different countries over the same period. Our dependent variable of 
interest is the individual perception of the anti-corruption handling which is observed for 
each individual in the dataset. The explanatory variables, suggested by the micro-evidences 
of corruption perception, include demographic factors (sex, age, education, employment 
status), living condition (index of poverty) and political characteristics (level of democracy, 
press freedom, trust in court of appeal, etc.) 
Our estimation method is the ordered probit with unknown parameters. Such an 
approach is justified by the fact that corruption data used here are rankings. The ordinary 
least squares model is not appropriate insofar as it treats equally the difference between 1 and 
2 as that between 3 and 4 (Greene, 2003). The probit or logit models would also fail to 
account for the ordinal nature of the dependent variable. 
The interest of pooling data from different countries is to have a maximum of 
information. Through this approach, we presuppose that behavior is uniform across the 
different countries studied. However, in order to control for the heterogeneity between 
countries, we included country dummy variables in the equations.  
 2.2- Data source and description 
  The data used in this analysis come from the first round of Afrobarometer households’ 
surveys in six countries in Africa over the period 1999-2001
1.  
Our investigations are based on the following question: “How well would you say the 
government is handling […] corruption?”  
The answer to this question has four modalities: 1=Very badly/Not at all well. 
2=Quite badly/Not very well. 3=Fairly well. 4=Very well. The other explanatory variables 
are described in table 1 below.  
 
Table 1: Definitions of the other variables 
Age  Age of the individual (continue)  
Sex   Female = 1; Male = 0 
Rural   = 1 if the individual lives in rural areas and 0 in the city  
Education    Level of education: 0 = no formal education; 1 = Primary 2 = 
Secondary; 3 = Post-secondary (treated as a continuous variable)  
Indicator of poverty   = (povfoo + povhth + povinc + povwat + pfeerd + pfenow) / 6  
(simple average of indicators of access to food, health care, drinking 
water, with no income, living conditions and economic situation in 
the country) 0 = never; 1 = rarely; 2 = often; 3 = forever 
Level of general trust  1 = You can have confidence in most people; 2 = You should be 
careful. 
Member of an association   =  1  if  the  respondent is a member of a local development 
association. religion or a business association , O otherwise 
Take part in a demonstration   if the respondent has participated in a demonstration (community 
meetings. political demonstrations)  
0 = never; 1 = once or twice; 2 = only a few times; 3 = often  
Write to the press   Write to the press: 0 = never; 1 = once or twice; 2 = only a few 
times ;3 = often 
Listen to the radio   (medrad) 0 = never; 1 = less than once per month; 2 = roughly once 
a month; 3 = roughly once a week; 4 = Several times a week; 5 = 
Every day  
Watching TV   (medtv) 0 = never ;1 = less than once a month; 2 = roughly once a 
month; 3 = roughly once a week; 4 = Several times a week; 5 = 
Every day  
Read newspapers   (mednew) 0 = never; 1 = less than once a month; 2 = roughly once a 
month; 3 = roughly once a week; 4 = Several times a week; 5 = 
Every day  
Access to information   1 if (medrad> = 3 | medtv> = 1 | mednew> = 1); 0 otherwise 
Democracy   =1 if respondent considers that democracy means “voting/electoral 
choice/ competition multiparty” and =0 otherwise  
Confidence in the Court of Appeal   1 = not at all; 2 = a few times; 3 = most of the time; 4=always. 
Unemployed   1 = if the interviewee says that he is unemployed; 0 otherwise 
informal worker   = 1 if the individual works in the informal sector; 0 otherwise  
Businessman   1 = if the interviewee is a businessman;  0 otherwise  
Officer   1 = if the respondent is an official; 0 otherwise  
NGOs   = 1 if the respondent works in an NGO ;0 otherwise 
Farmer   = 1 if the respondent is a farmer; 0 otherwise 
Politician   1 = if the interviewee is a politician; 0 otherwise 
 
                                                 
1 The data are available on www.afrobarometer.org.  
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 2.3- Descriptive statistics 
  Table 2 presents the salient features of these data by country. Countries could be 
classified in two groups. In the first group, which can be described as "most inefficient", 
Ghana and South African Republic are at the top. The actions of government in these 
countries are perceived as inefficient, according to a global assessment by over 33% of the 
male population as against only 28% of women. Thus, in Ghana nearly 61% of respondents 
felt that the anti-corruption policy is very poor. This view seems to be shared by people in 
other countries including the South African Republic and Mali where the figure is 
respectively 67% and 51%. The second category of countries, the "most efficient", includes 
Nigeria, Tanzania and Uganda with 64%, 55% and 51%
2 of people surveyed who consider 
public actions have some effectiveness. In all cases, there was no clearcut distinction between 
urban and rural populations. 
 
Table 2- Handling of corruption in six selected African countries 
Countries 
 Very   
badly  
 Quite   
badly  
 Fairly   
well 
 Very   
well 





Ghana    43.46   17.81  21.86  9.38   7.14   0.35   100 
Mali    25.71   25.51  21.11   14.84   12.83  0.00   100 
Nigeria    14.85   16.40  45.16   19.04    4.55   0.00   100 
South  Africa    39.50   27.64  20.64  8.23   4.00   0.00   100 
Tanzania    25.25   17.52  37.63   17.06    2.55   0.00   100 
Uganda    18.32   19.29  36.50   14.88   10.52  0.48   100 
All  countries    17.57   13.52  21.44  9.65   4.45    33.37    100 
Source: our calculation, based on Afrobarometer data 
 
  The opinion differs according to occupation or employment status. While more than a 
third of the unemployed, religious leaders and employers rated anti-corruption policy poorly 
or very poorly, politicians, soldiers and officials had a (very) favorable opinion (48%, 67%, 
40% respectively). It is tempting to conclude that officials appreciate the positive actions of 
the State. In contrast, the police negatively appreciate (24%) the same policy. 
 
3- Results 
  Before interpreting the results, a few points are worth noting. First, the interpretation 
of coefficients obtained by the ordered probit model is not straightforward (Greene, 2003). It 
is also necessary to clarify the direction in which the indicator of corruption varies. As for the 
variable representing the fight against corruption, 4 means that the policies implemented by 
public authorities are considered very effective.  
 
Econometric results are reported in table 3. Four columns are presented so as to take 
into account the interactions between poverty and access to information. When we look at the 
evaluation of anti-corruption policy, in all specifications, older people are non skeptical 
toward the authorities corruption handling. In both cases, the probability of perception 
decreases after a certain threshold. This threshold is estimated approximately to be 54-55 
years. Women perceive anti-corruption policies to be more efficient. This finding suggests 
that women may perceive differently corruption itself and handling of corruption since other 
                                                 
2 These figures are obtained by adding proportions in “fairly well” and “very well”. 
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 international analyses (Swamy et al., 2001; Gatti et al., 2003) show that females are less 
prone to corrupt behavior.  
People who interact less frequently with public administration seem to perceive anti-
corruption policy as more effective. This is the case of rural inhabitants, for example. 
Furthermore, the poorer people are, the better they evaluate anti-corruption policy. These 
results are also consistent with the appreciation of peasants who consider that public 
authorities undertake more effective anti-corruption policy. On the contrary, major 
differences appear among different employment categories which have intensive interactions 
with public administrations. There is no difference in the evaluation of anti-corruption policy 
between public officials, businessmen and other categories of workers. The non-significance 
of NGO dummy is surprising since, as independent organizations, they are supposed to 
support anti-corruption programs (Khemani, 2009). 
Furthermore, more educated people consider that corruption is not well handled by 
public authorities. They probably evaluate more severely the performance of public 
administration.  
 
General trust in the society (proxy for the social capital) and trust in the court of 
appeal (proxy for law enforcement) have two opposing effects. The higher is the former, the 
less effective corruption handling is; whereas the higher the latter the more effective 
corruption combating is evaluated. Even though these factors do not affect the payment of 
bribe as shown by Guerrero and Rodríguez-Oreggia (2008) in Mexico, they are important in 
handling of corruption. 
The press freedom significantly affects corruption handling. People believe that if 
they can easily write to the press to denounce the abuse of public officials, then the anti-
corruption policy might be more effective. However, listening to radio, watching TV and 
reading news have only a limited effect in the evaluation of anti-corruption policy. While 
press freedom’s result is consistent with the important role of information in curbing 
corruption as evidenced by other authors (Reinikka and Svensson, 2005; Brunetti and Weder, 
2002), our results suggest that people must take part actively in information delivery. People 
do not have just to listen to radio or to watch TV but they must express their voice on 
corruption practices and experiences, may it be in participating in public debates or attending 
demonstrations. Though, consistent with other empirical analysis (Paldam, 2002; Treisman, 
2000; Rose-Ackerman, 1999; Serra, 2006), democracy, considered as a political system open 
to voting, electoral choice and multiparty competition, does not significantly affect the 
citizens’ attitudes toward anti-corruption policies.  
One may question whether most of previous results are not driven by the poverty. For 
example, not all poor people can afford radio or TV. As they are also less educated, they have 
less access to information. So, the coefficients associated with these factors are likely to be 
biased. Our main results do not fundamentally change when we exclude the poverty variable 




Table 3: Microeconomic determinants of the perception of handling of corruption 
 
    Handling corruption (pfpcr1) 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Age  -0.017*** -0.017*** -0.016*** -0.016*** 
  (3.35) (3.28) (3.23) (3.23) 
Age squared  0.000***  0.000***  0.000**  0.000** 
  (2.74) (2.62) (2.54) (2.52) 
Gender  (Female=1)  0.118*** 0.113*** 0.117*** 0.115*** 
  (4.11) (3.99) (4.07) (4.09) 
Rural  0.172*** 0.159*** 0.205*** 0.198*** 
  (4.79) (4.69) (5.80) (6.01) 
Education  -0.072*** -0.066*** -0.085*** -0.084*** 
  (3.69) (3.54) (4.30) (4.40) 
Indicator of poverty  0.295***  0.296***     
 (5.29)  (5.28)     
General  trust  in  the  society  -0.047*** -0.048*** -0.046*** -0.046*** 
  (3.38) (3.46) (3.31) (3.34) 
Being member of an association  -0.035  -0.026  -0.004  -0.004 
  (1.06) (0.79) (0.11) (0.11) 
Participate in a demonstration   0.099***       
  (2.62)     
Write to the press  0.046***  0.048***  0.054***  0.054*** 
  (4.01) (4.21) (4.67) (4.65) 
Listen  to  radio  -0.010  -0.011  
 (1.07)    (1.17)   
Watching  TV  0.008  0.006  
 (0.91)    (0.63)   
Reading  news  -0.001  -0.005  
 (0.13)    (0.46)   
Access to information   -0.075   -0.092* 
   (1.51)  (1.86) 
Democracy  -0.077 -0.076 -0.084 -0.084 
  (1.42) (1.41) (1.56) (1.56) 
Trust in the court of appeal  0.144***  0.144***  0.148***  0.148*** 
  (13.60) (13.55) (13.96) (13.95) 
Unemployed 0.195*  0.195*  0.171  0.169 
  (1.87) (1.87) (1.61) (1.59) 
Dummy informal worker  -0.017 -0.024 -0.011 -0.014 
  (0.42) (0.60) (0.27) (0.35) 
Dummy  businessman  0.068 0.069 0.077 0.081 
  (1.04) (1.06) (1.20) (1.25) 
Dummy  official  0.032 0.037 0.048 0.053 
  (0.23) (0.26) (0.34) (0.37) 
Dummy  NGO  0.189 0.184 0.200 0.196 
  (1.48) (1.45) (1.58) (1.56) 
Dummy peasant  0.260*  0.261*  0.330**  0.328** 
  (1.87) (1.89) (2.38) (2.37) 
Dummy  politician  0.364 0.347 0.358 0.356 
  (1.53) (1.48) (1.60) (1.61) 
Country  dummies  YES YES YES YES 
Number  of  observations  6312 6312 6312 6312 

































4- Concluding remarks 
The purpose of the paper was to investigate the public attitude toward the handling of 
corruption in six selected African countries using Afrobarometer households’ survey data. 
Hence, effectiveness of anti-corruption policies is considered. Existing works, focusing 
mostly on perception of corruption, pay a little if not any attention to this issue.  
The econometric results emphasize the importance of individual, social and political 
factors in evaluating the efficiency of anti-corruption strategies. Some results are consistent 
with empirical analyses of determinants of corruption. Education, gender, the press freedom 
have active role to play in designing efficient anti-corruption strategies. Democracy does not 
significantly affect the performance of corruption handling. Emphasis should be put on 
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